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I. INTRODUCTION
Increasingly, science and the law are intersecting. Today, most sci-
entific or professional disciplines provide expert testimony in courts.
Product liability cases may involve engineering testimony and personal
injury cases may involve medical testimony. Some criminal cases can-
not be tried without the assistance of experts, e.g., a homicide in which
the cause of death is testified to by forensic pathologists. With the ad-
vent of even more advanced scientific techniques such as DNA testing'
of blood, semen and tissue and increased reliance on science, there has
been a corresponding proliferation of court decisions involving scientific
evidence and expert testimony. This survey collects and discusses sig-
nificant Florida opinions on scientific evidence and expert testimony re-
ported in Florida between October 1, 1988 and January 1, 1991.
II. LAY WITNESS OPINION
Black's Law Dictionary defines opinion evidence as "evidence of
what the witness thinks, believes or infers in regard to facts in dispute,
as distinguished from his personal knowledge of the facts themselves."12
Opinion testimony as to matters readily perceptible by the jury, within
their common knowledge, is inadmissible.
However, a lay witness may testify under certain circumstances in
the form of an opinion. The Florida Evidence Code section 90.701 per-
mits opinion testimony by lay witnesses when: (1) the witness cannot
readily, and with equal accuracy, communicate what he has perceived
* Associate Professor of Law, Nova University Shepard Broad Law Center;
B.A., 1976, University of Florida; J.D., 1980, George Washington University. The au-
thor thanks Ian Berkowitz for his assistance in the research of this article.
1. DNA testing identifies individuals by their patterns of deoxyribonucleic acid
(DNA) contained in their cells. Every individual, except an identical twin, possesses a
unique genetic "blueprint" in his DNA. The first appellate court ruling on the admissi-
bility of DNA evidence was in Florida. Andrews v. State, 533 So. 2d 841 (Fla. 5th
Dist. Ct. App. 1988).
2. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1093 (6th ed. 1990).
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without resort to opinion; (2) the witness' use of opinion will not mis-
lead the trier of fact; and (3) the witness'opinion does not require spe-
cial knowledge, skill, experience or training.3 Therefore, under this rule
lay witnesses typically are permitted to testify to matters such as
height, a person's emotional state, etc. (i.e., those things perceptible by
the senses) because such matters do not require specialized education,
training or skill to render an opinion.
Historically, Florida law has permitted lay witness identification of
an individual, including identification by voice.' In State v. Cordia,
5
the defendant, a police officer, was charged with making a false report
of a bomb. The caller's voice was recorded on tape. The state sought to
call as witnesses two police officers who had spoken to the defendant
over the telephone but were not the individuals who had received the
phone call. The tape was "routinely destroyed." Cordia moved in
limine to exclude testimony regarding the officers' opinion as to the
identity of the voice. The trial court granted the motion and the state
appealed. The Second District Court of Appeal held that the officers'
testimony would not constitute an impermissible opinion as to the guilt
of the accused. 6
The court found the facts in Cordia not unlike those in Hardie v.
State, 7 in which a store theft was recorded by a surveillance camera.
The views afforded by the pictures were limited so the state brought in
police officers who knew Hardie to identify him as one of the thieves.'
The appellate court approved the identification procedure.
The court in Cordia distinguished this case from Ruffin v. State,"
in which three officers testified at trial, over objection of defense coun-
sel, that in their opinion the defendant was the man in a videotaped
transaction between himself and a plainclothes police officer who was
purchasing two pieces of a rock-like substance reputed to have been
cocaine. The court held that this identification was an invasion of the
province of the jury, and that these factual determinations were within
3. FLA. STAT. § 90.701 (1989).
4. State v. Cordia, 564 So. 2d 601-02 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1990) (per curiam)
(citing Weinshenker v. State, 223 So. 2d 561 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App.), cert. denied, 225
So. 2d 918, cert. denied, 396 U.S. 973 (1969)).
5. 564 So. 2d 601 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1990) (per curiam).
6. Id. at 602.
7. 513 So. 2d 791 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1987), rev. denied, 520 So. 2d 586
(Fla. 1988).
8. Cordia, 564 So. 2d at 602.
9. 549 So. 2d 250 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1989).
[Vol. 151254
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the realm of an ordinary juror's knowledge and experience.'" Therefore,
in order for lay witnesses' opinions regarding identification to be admis-
sible the witnesses should either be eyewitnesses, or witnesses capable
of independently making an identification from photographs, tape re-
cordings or similar evidence." This was the case in Cordia, where the
witnesses claimed to possess special knowledge of Cordia's voice char-
acteristics beyond what a jury could conclude on its own.' 2
Even lay opinions must meet certain predicates before they will be
admitted. In Lawlor v. State," a manslaughter case, the lay witness
resided approximately 100 feet from the highway where the collision
occurred and testified that he was inside his house and heard a car pass
at very high speed. He stated that the car was traveling so fast he did
not hear it approach, and about two seconds after it passed, he heard
the impact of the collision. The court found the testimony improperly
admitted because of the absence of a sufficient predicate. The court
stated that an "opinion as to the speed of the vehicle should be predi-
cated upon certain identifying factors such as the weight of the respec-
tive vehicles involved, road conditions, and the coefficient of friction."' 4
However, the court held that because the speed of the vehicle was not
an essential element of the offense of manslaughter by intoxication,' 5
the error was harmless.' 6
III. EXPERT OPINION TESTIMONY
When scientific, technical or other specialized knowledge will be
helpful to the trier of fact in understanding the evidence, the tradi-
tional method of supplying such information is through an expert wit-
ness' opinion. Section 90.702 of the Florida Evidence Code allows ex-
pert witness testimony if the court determines the information will
assist the trier of fact.'" As part of this inquiry the court may be re-
10. Id. at 251.
11. Cordia, 564 So. 2d at 602.
12. Id.
13. 538 So. 2d 86 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1989).
14. Id. at 88 (citing Brown v. State, 477 So. 2d 609 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App.
1985)).
15. See FLA. STAT. § 316.1931(2)(c) (1985) (repealed 1986).
16. Lawlor, 538 So. 2d at 88.
17. FLA. STAT. § 90.702 (1989) provides:
If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the
trier of fact in understanding the evidence or in determining a fact in is-
1991] 1255
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quired to determine if a reliable body of scientific, technical or special-
ized knowledge has been developed. The second aspect of the court's
inquiry is to determine whether the witness proffered is qualified to give
the testimony sought. A witness may be qualified as an expert on the
basis of either knowledge, skill, experience, training, education, or a
combination thereof.18
Expert opinion testimony is only admissible when it assists the
trier of fact and does not invade its province. In Vega v. City of Pom-
pano Beach, 9 the court held that the trial court did not err in exclud-
ing the testimony of the plaintiff's expert witnesses who were to testify
as experts in aquatic safety sports and recreational facilities.2 0 The trial
court refused to allow the proffered testimony because it was within the
common knowledge of the jury. The appellate court held that expert
testimony, while desirable, was not essential because the facts did not
require any special knowledge or experience in order for the jury to
form its conclusion.2 The court noted that "Florida courts have held
that the question of whether expert testimony is essential in proving a
particular issue is determined by the issue involved."22 The issue in this
case was within the ordinary understanding of the jury.2 3
A. Qualifications of an Expert
In Cheshire v. State,24 the appellant appealed from an order im-
posing a death sentence. He was found guilty of killing his estranged
wife. Among other issues on appeal, Cheshire alleged that the trial
court improperly qualified a person as an expert on blood-spattered evi-
dence. The expert's qualifications consisted of a forty-hour course,
three prior qualifications as an expert, and his own field experience.
The court, while agreeing that these qualifications were open to reason-
able question on cross-examination, held that the trial court did not
sue, a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, train-
ing, or education may testify about it in the form of an opinion; however,
the opinion is admissible only if it can be applied to evidence at trial.
18. Id.
19. 551 So. 2d 594 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1989).
20. Id. at 596.
21. Id.
22. Id. (citing Alten Box Board Co. v. Pantya, 236 So. 2d 452 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct.
App. 1970)).
23. Id.
24. 568 So. 2d 908 (Fla. 1990).
1256 [Vol. 15
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abuse its discretion by admitting his expert testimony, since a reasona-
ble basis existed to qualify the expert.25 In Williams v. State,26 the
court also held that the trial court did not err in permitting the state to
introduce the testimony of an officer with specialized knowledge on
drug transactions. The court found that a reasonable basis existed to
qualify his opinion as expert on the relationship between a large
amount of cash and drug transactions in a prosecution for possession of
cocaine with intent to sell.27
However, not all experience qualifies one to provide an expert
opinion. In Adamson v. State,8 the appellate court held that the trial
court acted within its bounds of discretion in ruling that a police officer
was not qualified to testify as an expert regarding the effects of
cocaine.
In Tarin v. City National Bank,2" the court held that the trial
court did not commit reversible error by excluding the investigating
police officer's opinions regarding whether a parking lot created an illu-
sion that both vehicles in the accident had the right-of-way.30 The of-
ficer was not qualified as an expert in traffic accident reconstruction.
The officer's only training was acquired through employment with the
Florida Highway Patrol for six years prior to the accident. Although he
was involved in trooper and homicide investigations, he could not even
describe what it entailed. He testified that he attended the Florida
Highway Patrol Academy and received a certificate representing forty
hours of training in traffic homicide and forty hours of training in acci-
dent reconstruction with a professor from the University of Miami. He
was unable to provide a description of the training received. He testi-
fied that he had handled accidents, but did not state how many or over
what period of time. The court held that the showing was too sketchy
to qualify the officer as an expert in accident investigation or
reconstruction. 3'
In Mathieu v. Schnitzer,32 the appellant attempted to have an ac-
cident investigator declared an expert in accident reconstruction. Upon
25. Id. at 913.
26. 538 So. 2d 73 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1989).
27. Id.; cf. Hosbein v. Silverstein, 358 So. 2d 43 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App.), cert.
denied, 365 So. 2d 714 (Fla. 1978).
28. 569 So. 2d 495 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1990) (per curiam).
29. 557 So. 2d 632 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1990).
30. Id. at 633.
31. Id.
32. 559 So. 2d 1244 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1990).
1991] 1257
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defense objection the court recognized the witness only as an expert in
accident investigation, concluding that her qualifications were inade-
quate for her to testify as an accident reconstructionist.13 The appellate
court, while conceding that a trial court's decision on the qualifications
of an expert is ordinarily conclusive and entitled to great weight on
appeal, ruled that the trial court applied erroneous legal principles in
arriving at its decision. 4 The appellate court concluded that the wit-
ness' experience in investigating the cause of accidents, and her years
of work experience were sufficient to qualify her as an expert in acci-
dent reconstruction. The court reasoned that because there was no evi-
dence of skid marks, debris, or point of impact, an accident reconstruc-
tionist's expert opinion would not be necessary.3 5 The appellate court
found, based on the evidence, that expert testimony concerning the cor-
relation between the bumper of appellee's car and appellant's injury
was already within her expertise as an accident investigator."
Thus, although a trial court's decision on the qualifications of an
expert witness ordinarily will not be overturned on appeal unless it is
determined the trial court abused its discretion,37 such an abuse of dis-
cretion may be found when the court excludes proffered experts whose
specialized training or experience established a prima facie case of
their expertise.38
33. Id. at 1245.
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. See Lewis v. State, 592 So. 2d 908 (Fla. 1990) (per curiam). The Florida
Supreme Court held it was not error to exclude a psychiatrist's opinion regarding the
eyewitness identification process, the effects of drugs on memory, and the unwarranted
reliance of jurors on eyewitness testimony. Id. at 911. The court found no abuse of
discretion, especially in light of the psychiatrist's admission that he could not testify
regarding the reliability of any specific witness, but could only offer general comments
as to how a witness would arrive at such conclusions. Id.; see also Johnson v. State, 393
So. 2d 1069 (Fla. 1980).
38. See Lake Hosp. & Clinic, Inc. v. Silversmith, 551 So. 2d 538 (Fla. 4th Dist.
Ct. App. 1989) (the appellate court held the trial court erred by excluding the appel-
lant's expert witnesses because they were not qualified to testify to Joint Commission
on Accreditation of Hospitals (JCAH) standards. The appellate court noted that both
experts were experienced in hospital administration and had special training or experi-
ence with JCAH standards); see also, Tallahassee Memorial Regional Medical Center,
Inc. v. Meeks, 543 So. 2d 770 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1989). Appellants argued that
the trial court erred in admitting the pathologist's testimony concerning the decedent's
pre-death symptoms. Appellants argued the pathologist was not qualified to express an
opinion because he had no personal knowledge of the pre-death symptoms, for the de-
1258 [Vol. 15
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In the case of Laffman v. Sherrod,3 9 the court reversed a ruling by
the trial court permitting a police officer, who was not an eyewitness, to
testify on the basis of field examination that the head lamp on a moped
involved in a collision was not on at the time of the accident. In fact,
the officer arrived on the scene several minutes after the collision. Since
the officer was not qualified as an expert, the trial court ruled that
there could be no cross-examination as to the basis of his opinion.40 On
appeal the court found that the officer was not competent to render
such an opinion. 41 The trial court's denial of cross-examination was il-
logical because the basis of a lay witness' opinion is no less important
than that of an expert.
In the same case, an expert in accident reconstruction and metal-
lurgy was permitted to render an opinion based on an examination of
orthopedic x-rays as to the cause of Laffman's injuries. Such examina-
tion required knowledge or training in radiology or orthopedic
medicine, which the expert lacked.42 However, the trial court, inconsis-
tently, permitted the expert to render his opinion on causation, which
was based upon the same study which was excluded as evidence. The
appellate court held that this constituted substantial prejudicial error
and reversed and remanded the case.43
cedent was dead on arrival. The court held his statements on direct examination clari-
fied that he, as a medical examiner, did not consider pre-death symptoms when per-
forming an autopsy. Id. at 772. The court agreed that the trial judge correctly
determined that the testimony objected to by the appellants was not beyond the exper-
tise of the medical examiner who is a pathologist. Id. As a result, the testimony was
admissible.
The court stated that the rule in Florida, as in'most jurisdictions, is that absent a
clear showing of error, a trial judge's determination of admissibility will not be dis-
turbed upon review. It concluded that the two criteria determining admissibility were
met in this case: (1) the subject must be beyond the common understanding of the
average layman; and (2) the witness must have such knowledge as will probably aid the
trier of fact. Id. The court reasoned that if a pathologist was qualified to testify to more
than what he directly observed from an autopsy, he could render an opinion regarding
events preceding death. Id.
39. 565 So. 2d 760 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1990).
40. Id. at 761.
41. id.
42. Id. at 762.
43. Id.
1991] 1259
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B. Scope and Basis of Expert Opinion Testimony
Under Florida law, it is fundamental error for an expert to testify
beyond his qualifications. 4 Such error is not harmless when the ex-
pert's testimony is the only testimony in the record supporting the find-
ings of the trial court. Section 90.704 of the Florida Statutes also does
not permit an expert witness in one field to testify about the expert
opinion given to him by another expert.45 In Harrison v. Savers Fed-
eral Savings and Loan Association,4" an appraiser's expert opinion on
the value of a shopping center was based upon the opinion of an archi-
tect who was not called to testify. The court held the appraiser incom-
petent to testify on the location and design of the shopping center.4 7
The only other evidence in the case regarding the design issue was the
court's sua sponte view of the site, which was not found sufficient to
serve as an independent basis for judgment.4 8 Thus, in order to avoid a
new trial, a competent predicate must be laid for the expert's opinion. 9
In Newell v. Best Security Systems, Inc.,50 the trial court excluded
a sheriff's deputy's testimony regarding prior criminal incidents in the
area of a condominium, and also excluded a security expert's testimony
regarding whether or not the security measures at the condominium
were adequate in light of the criminal activity in the area. The appel-
late court upheld the trial court's exclusion of the expert testimony.
The security expert did not consult the police records of the reported
incidents but had relied solely on a police grid breakout. As such, he
could not testify that the burglaries he reported were residential bur-
44. Wright v. State, 348 So. 2d 26 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App.), cert. denied, 353 So.
2d 679 (Fla. 1977).
45. FLA. STAT. § 90.704 (1989); see also Bunyak v. Clyde J. Yancey & Sons
Dairy, 438 So. 2d 891, 893 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1983), rev. denied, 447 So. 2d 885
(Fla. 1984). Section 90.704 provides:
The facts or data upon which an expert bases an opinion or inference may
be those perceived by, or made known to, him at or before the trial. If the
facts or data are of a type reasonably relied upon by experts in the subject
or support the opinion expressed, the facts or data need not be admissible
in evidence.
FLA. STAT. § 90.704.
46. 549 So. 2d 712 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1989).
47. Id. at 713.
48. Id. at 714.
49. See Urling v. Helms Exterminators, Inc., 468 So. 2d 451, 456 (Fla. 1st Dist.
Ct. App. 1985) (on rehearing).
50. 560 So. 2d 395 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1990).
1260 [Vol. 15
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glaries. Because the expert's opinion was based on unconfirmed data
and the appellant failed to establish the underlying facts on which it
was based, the trial court did not abuse its discretion by refusing to
admit the testimony.5 1
While section 90.704 of the Florida Statutes allows the expert to
rely on facts or data of the type reasonably relied upon by experts in
the field to support the opinion expressed, the expert may not introduce
inadmissible matters in the course of his direct examination. 2 In
Smithson v. V.M.S. Realty Inc.,53 a wrongful death action, appellant
argued that the trial court erred in permitting the defendant to use an
expert witness on security, where he served as a conduit for the intro-
duction of inadmissible and prejudicial hearsay.
The individuals who robbed and murdered the appellant's husband
while he was attempting to make a deposit at a night depository at the
mall were interviewed by V.M.S.'s expert witness. Upon direct exami-
nation, when questioned about the adequacy of V.M.S.'s security, the
expert recited the murderers' out-of-court explanations about their plan
and motive for committing the crime. The court stated that the witness
was qualified to render an opinion on security matters and on the de-
fendant's alleged negligence in security procedures, but not on the mur-
derers' motives for choosing the decedent as their target. 4
The same issue was raised in Kurynka v. Tamarac Hospital
Corp., Inc." A 31-year old woman was being treated for asthma in a
hospital emergency room when she went into cardiac arrest. The labo-
ratory report reflected a urinalysis which found cocaine metabolite. The
tests had been performed by an independent laboratory and had been
placed in the hospital records. The defense sought to admit the report
to support its position that cocaine withdrawal, not medical malprac-
tice, was the cause of death. The defense argued that the results of the
tests were admissible under the business records exception to the hear-
say rule. It also argued that the evidence would be admissible since the
report was used by the defense experts as a basis for their opinions.
The appellate court concluded that medical records, just as any other
type of business record, cannot be admitted without a predicate demon-
51. Id. at 397.
52. FLA. STAT. § 90.704 (1989).
53. 536 So. 2d 260 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1988).
54. Id. at 262.
55. 542 So. 2d 412 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1989).
1991] 1261
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strating the authenticity of the records. 6 The appellate court pointed
out that an expert's testimony may not be used merely to serve as a
conduit to place otherwise inadmissable evidence before a jury.57 Here,
there was no independent testimony regarding how the tests were con-
ducted, or who performed them or even whether the samples used were
those of the decedent. Considering the totality of the evidence, the ap-
pellate court concluded that the trial court's error in admitting the lab-
oratory report required reversal and remand for a new trial.58
Another case which held that expert testimony may not be used as
a conduit to put inadmissible evidence before a jury is Riggins v. Mari-
ner Boatworks, Inc . 5 There, Riggins was struck and killed by defend-
ants' automobile as he entered a crosswalk in an intersection patrolled
by a traffic light. The defendants attempted to establish that the acci-
dent was caused in whole or in part by Riggins' intoxication. A police
officer at the scene of the accident testified that Riggins had an odor of
alcohol about him; however, neither the emergency medical technician
who performed cardiopulmonary resuscitation upon Riggins, nor the
medical technician who examined the body detected an odor of alcohol.
There were no hospital records indicating Riggins was intoxicated at
the time of the accident. During the autopsy the medical examiner took
a sample of Riggins' ocular vitreous fluid6" and sent the material to the
laboratory to determine its alcohol content. A sample of the fluid was
utilized because there was not enough blood remaining in the body to
obtain a blood sample. Neither the medical examiner nor the labora-
tory technician who performed the test was available to testify at trial.
The trial court ruled that the laboratory report was inadmissible
hearsay. While it may have been a business record, the defendants did
not present sufficient evidence to establish the foundation required by
section 90.803(6) of the Florida Statutes.6 After the laboratory report
56. Id. at 413.
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. 545 So. 2d 430 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1989).
60. This is the fluid contained in the vitreous body. The vitreous body forms
four-fifths of the entire globe of the eye. It fills the concavity of the retina for the
reception of the lens. It is transparent, the consistence of thin jelly, and is composed of
an albuminous fluid enclosed in a delicate transparent membrane. H GRAY, GRAY'S
ANATOMY 839 (1974).
61. Riggins, 545 So. 2d at 431. FLA. STAT. § 90.803(6) (1989) provides:
(a) A memorandum, report, record, or data compilation, in any form, of
acts, events, conditions, opinion, or diagnosis, made at or near the time by,
1262 [Vol. 15
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was excluded, the defendants called a chemical toxicologist. Over plain-
tiff's objection, the trial court permitted this expert to testify that the
blood alcohol level was .11 % at the time the ocular vitreous fluid sam-
ple was taken. The trial court permitted this testimony pursuant to sec-
tion 90.704 of the Florida Statutes, which permits an expert to base his
opinion upon inadmissible facts or data so long as "the facts or data
are of the type reasonably relied upon by experts on the subject to sup-
port the opinion expressed. ' 2 The appellate court reversed. While rec-
ognizing that experts are permitted to express opinions based partially
upon inadmissible information, the court pointed out that the use of
expert testimony merely to serve as a conduit to place otherwise inad-
missible evidence before a jury is prohibited.63 The expert relied exclu-
sively upon information that was not in evidence at trial. The expert
opinion only helped the jury understand the inadmissible evidence
rather than any evidence admitted at trial.64
Additionally, the court concluded that section 90.704 does not per-
mit an expert to render an opinion exclusively upon inadmissible facts
or data.65 The court opined that even if the opinion was relevant it was
unfairly prejudicial to the plaintiff and misled the jury by emphasizing
otherwise inadmissible evidence and placing "an aura of scientific truth
upon a document which is legally unreliable. Thus its probative value is
substantially outweighed by its prejudicial effect."6 The court also
noted that while an expert's testimony may not be used as a conduit for
or from information transmitted by, a person with knowledge, if kept in
the course of a regularly conducted business activity and if it was the regu-
lar practice of that business activity to make such memorandum, report,
record, or data compilation, all as shown by the testimony of the custodian
or other qualified witness, unless the sources of information or other cir-
cumstances show lack of trustworthiness. The term "business" as used in
this paragraph includes a business, institution, association, profession, oc-
cupation, and calling of every kind, whether or not conducted for profit.
(b) No evidence in the form of an opinion or diagnosis is admissible under
paragraph (a) unless such opinion or diagnosis would be admissible under
ss. 90.701-90.705 if the person whose opinion is recorded were to testify to
the opinion directly.
62. FLA. STAT. § 90.704 (1987). The chemist testified that expert toxicologists
rely on such reports.
63. Riggins, 545 So. 2d at 431-32.
64. Id at 432.
65. Id.
66. Id. (quoting FLA. STAT. § 90.704 (1987)).
1991] 1263
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the introduction of otherwise inadmissible evidence6 7 the party against
whom the expert opinion is offered may require the expert to reveal the
content of the hearsay information on which the expert relied.6 8
C. Evaluation of Expert Testimony
It is the general rule that the weight accorded expert testimony is
properly a function of the trier of fact. A pretrial ruling by the court
rejecting proffered testimony based on its weight as opposed to its ad-
missibility usurps the jury function. Whether there was usurpation of
the jury function was the issue in Lombard v. Executive Elevator Ser-
vice, Inc.69 The trial court held a pretrial conference and instructed the
plaintiff's counsel to make a proffer of the evidence he intended to pro-
duce to prove negligence on the part of the defendant. In the course of
the involuntary proffer, counsel. was cross-examined at length by the
court because it was not satisfied with counsel's grasp of the expert
evidence. The court then requested that the plaintiff's expert witness be
produced the following week for a live proffer. The expert witness made
a brief presentation and was cross-examined by the trial court for over
an hour. The trial court, on its own motion, entered a summary judg-
ment for the defendant.
On appeal the court stated its disapproval of the use of a pretrial
conference to take testimony for the purpose of disposing of a case on
the court's unnoticed summary judgment motion."0 The court further
stated that summary judgment procedures should be applied with spe-
cial caution in negligence actions where the showing of negligence is
determined on expert testimony which should be evaluated by the jury
and not by the court."
D. Psychiatric and Psychological Expert Opinion Testimony
The introduction of psychiatric and psychological expert testimony
poses particular evidentiary problems. In Florida, a court-appointed
psychiatrist may be offered as a witness in the State's case but may not
testify directly about the facts surrounding the crime, when such facts
67. Id.
68. Department of Corrections v. Williams, 549 So. 2d 1071, 1072 (Fla. 5th
Dist. Ct. App. 1989).
69. 545 So. 2d 453 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1989).
70. Id. at 455.
71. Id.
1264 [Vol. 15
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have been elicited from the defendant during his compulsory medical
examination.7 2
In Ericson v. State,73 the court found that a court-appointed psy-
chiatrist may testify regarding his opinion of the defendant's mental
condition, but may not disclose incriminating statements made to him
by other defendants, or disclose the facts surrounding the crime elicited
from the defendant during the course of the examination.74 However,
there is an exception when the defendant .first opens the door to such
inquiry by his own presentation of evidence. 75 If on cross examination
the defendant's counsel opens the inquiry to collateral issues, such as
admissions or guilt, the state may inquire into those areas on redirect
examination. Or if the defendant offered psychiatric testimony during
his case and the defendant elicited testimony from his own expert
about the offense which the defendant provided during the interview,
then the defendant has opened the door and the state may explore the
areas on cross.76 In either instance the jury must be given a cautionary
instruction that these statements can be used as evidence of mental
condition only and not as evidence of the truth contained in them.
Where the defense is voluntary intoxication, Florida courts have
held that the defendant can be said to be testifying vicariously through
the expert if the expert bases his testimony on the defendant's self-
serving statement that he was intoxicated at the time of the offense.77
Thus, in those cases, the defendant is subject to impeachment by the
state even though the defendant does not take the stand.7 1
E. The Use of Expert Testimony in Child Abuse Cases
Increased prosecutions for child abuse and sex offenses raise the
problem of integrating experts and their opinions into a justice system
in which lay juries are the ultimate fact finders. Expert testimony is
sometimes used in child abuse cases to determine the competency of
the child witness to testify truthfully and accurately, but care must be
72. Id. (citing Parkin v. State, 238 So. 2d 817, 820 (Fla. 1970)).
73. 565 So. 2d 328 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1990).
74. Id. at 331.
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. See Cirack v. State, 201 So. 2d 706, 709 (Fla. 1967) (holding that a psychia-
trist could not provide an expert opinion where the basis of the testimony was the self-
serving statements of the defendant).
78. Id.
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taken to avoid invading the province of the jury to weigh and assess the
testimony. Such cases also raise constitutional concerns about the use
of victim hearsay. Several recent Florida cases illustrate this point.
Tingle v. State7 9 concerned an appeal from a conviction for sexual
battery of a minor. Tingle was convicted of the sexual battery of his
daughter. The state offered the expert testimony of an HRS intake
counselor and a social worker with the University of Florida's Depart-
ment of Pediatrics Child Protection Team.8 0 On direct examination,
both witnesses were asked whether they believed the child was telling
the truth. The court agreed that it was error to have allowed the two
witnesses to vouch for the victim's credibility.8' The court stated that it
is generally accepted that expert testimony may not be offered to di-
rectly vouch for the credibility of a witness.82 The court adopted the
position taken by the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals in United States
v. Azure,83 that "some expert testimony may be helpful in cases such as
this, but putting an impressively qualified expert stamp of truthfulness
on a witness' story goes too far." '84 Therefore, an expert may aid a jury
in assessing the truthfulness of a child sexual abuse victim by generally
testifying about a child's ability to separate truth from fantasy; by
summarizing the medical evidence and by expressing his cr her opinion
as to whether it was consistent with the victim's story; or by discussing
various patterns of consistency in the stories of child sexual abuse vic-
tims and comparing those patterns with patterns in the victim's story.8 5
However, the ultimate conclusion as to the victim's credibility must al-
ways rest with the jury.88
A further issue of concern in the use of expert witnesses in child
abuse cases is the extent to which witnesses are permitted to conclude
not only that the child had been abused but that a particular person
was the perpetrator. This issue was addressed in Glendening v. State."7
There, an expert in the area of child abuse testified that in her opinion
the child had been sexually abused by her father. The Florida Supreme
Court concluded that it was proper for an expert to express an opinion
79. 536 So. 2d 202 (Fla. 1988).
80. Id. at 204-05.
81. Id. at 205.
82. See Kruse v. State, 483 So. 2d 1383 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1986).
83. 801 F.2d 336 (8th Cir. 1986).
84. Tingle, 536 So. 2d at 205 (quoting Azure, 801 F.2d at 340).
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. 536 So. 2d 212 (Fla. 1988).
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as to whether a child had been the victim of sexual abuse, but "it was
improper for the expert witness to testify that it was her opinion that
the child's father was the person who committed this actual offense."88
The error did -not require reversal because the defense counsel had
'neither objected to the answer, nor moved to strike it. Therefore, the
issue was not properly preserved for appeal.8" Moreover, according to
the court, the error was not of a fundamental nature.
In Page v. Zordan,9 ° an action for damages was brought by a mi-
nor through her parents on her behalf and by her parents individually.
-Plaintiffs alleged that when Page was married to the minor's maternal
grandmother, he had on several occasions handled, fondled and touched
the minor in a lewd, lascivious and indecent manner. The plaintiffs
presented the testimony of five expert witnesses. The court was per-
suaded that the purpose of this expert testimony was to attest to the
credibility of the minor. However, much of the expert testimony was
inadmissible as being entirely irrelevant to the issues and highly preju-
dicial to the defendants. While the victim's counsel never directly asked
any of the expert witnesses whether they had an opinion as to whether
or not the defendant was guilty of the alleged act of child molestation,
the court explained that it was not necessary for such questions to be
asked directly to run afoul of the Tingle and Glendening rules.9 1 The
court held that the appellees' expert witnesses impermissibly intruded
into the function of the jury to determine such credibility questions.92
Another issue raised by the appellant in Page was the admissibility
of testimony of a clinical psychologist regarding a "sexual abuse legiti-
macy scale" which he used to evaluate the credibility of the minor's
statement that she had been sexually molested. 3 The expert was al-
lowed to testify about the minor's score on this test even though no
predicate had been established by the appellees regarding the accept-
ance of the test in the scientific community. The appellate court ruled
that in the absence of such supporting evidence, the trial court had
abused its discretion in admitting the testimony.94 The court relied on
Fay v. Mincey,95 where it was held that the admissibility of evidence
88. Id. at 220-21.
89. Id. at 221.
90. 564 So. 2d 500 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1990).
91. Id. at 502.
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. 454 So. 2d 587 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1984).
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relating to a relatively new scientific medical test, experiment, or proce-
dure lies largely within the discretion of the trial court. 96 However,
before such a new procedure and its results are admissible the court
must determine that the new test has some reasonable degree of recog-
nition and acceptability among the experts who studied, diagnosed,
tested and dealt with the particular subject to be examined and diag-
nosed by*the test.9 7
Weatherford v. State98 concerned an appeal from a conviction for
committing a lewd act upon a child in violation of section 800.04 of the
Florida Statutes.99 During trial, a member of the Child Protection
Team, an affiliate of the Department of Pediatrics of the University of
Florida, was qualified as an expert in the field of investigating and in-
terviewing children with regard to alleged sexual abuse. The expert, as
well as other witnesses, testified to the child's out-of-court statements.
The court did not comply with the requirement set forth in section
90.803 (23)(C) of the Florida Statutes, requiring the court to make
specific findings of fact on the record setting forth the reasons the court
determined the out-of-court statements to be reliable.1 0' The appellate
96. Page, 564 So. 2d at 502 (citing Fay, 454 So. 2d 587).
97. See Fay, 454 So. 2d at 593-94.
98. 561 So. 2d 629 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1990).
99. FLA. STAT. § 800.04 (1990) provides that any person who:
(1) Handles, fondles or makes an assault upon any child under the age of
16 years in a lewd, lascivious, or indecent manner;
(2) Commits actual or simulated sexual intercourse, deviate sexual inter-
course, sexual bestiality, masturbation, sadomasochistic abuse, actual lewd
exhibition of the genitals, or any act or conduct which simulates that sex-
ual battery is being or will be committed upon any child under the age of
16 years or forces or entices the child to commit any such act:
(3) Commits an act defined as sexual battery under s. 794.011 (l)(h) upon
any child under the age of 16 years; or
(4) Knowingly commits any lewd or lascivious act in the presence of any
child under the age of 16 years,
without committing the crime of sexual battery, commits a felony of the
second degree, punishable as provided in s. 775.082, s. 775.083, or s.
775.084. Neither the victim's lack of chastity nor the victim's consent is a
defense to the crime proscribed by this section.
100. Weatherford, 561 So. 2d at 633; see FLA. STAT. § 90.803(23), which
provides:
(a) Unless the source of information or the method or circumstances by
which the statement is reported indicates a lack of trustworthiness, an out-
of-court statement made by a child victim with a physical, mental, emo-
tional, or developmental age of I 1 or less describing any act of child abuse
1268 [Vol. 15
16
Nova Law Review, Vol. 15, Iss. 3 [1991], Art. 11
https://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol15/iss3/11
Garcia
court found that this was clear error. 10 1 The court relied on Fricke v.
State,02 where it was held such error violates the defendant's sixth
amendment right of confrontation. The appellate court also concluded
that the trial court erred in admitting the expert's testimony that she
used a number of techniques to determine whether the child's state-
ments were reliable and that she was satisfied these statements were
truthful.0 3 The expert was not introduced as an expert in determining
whether a child exhibited symptoms consistent with those of sexually
abused children. She was tendered as an expert in the so-called field of
"investigating and interviewing children involved in alleged sexual
abuse." 0 4 Therefore, her qualifications were limited to investigating in-
cidents and interviewing children. The court stated that it could not
or neglect, any act of sexual abuse against a child, the offense of child
abuse, the offense of aggravated child abuse, or any offense involving an
unlawful sexual act, contact, intrusion, or penetration performed in the
presence of, with, by, or on the declarant child, not otherwise admissible, is
admissible in evidence in any civil or criminal proceeding if:
1. The court finds in a hearing conducted outside the presence of the jury
that the time, content, and circumstances of the statement provide suffi-
cient safeguards of reliability. In making its determination, the court may
consider the mental and physical age and maturity of the child, the nature
and duration of the abuse or offense, the relationship of the child to the
offender, the reliability of the assertion, the reliability of the child victim,
and any other factor deemed appropriate and
2. The child either:
a. Testifies, or
b. Is unavailable as a witness, provided that there is other corrobora-
tive evidence of the abuse or offense. Unavailability shall include a finding
by the court that the child's participation in the trial or proceeding would
result in a substantial likelihood of severe emotional or mental harm, in
addition to findings pursuant to s. 90.804(1).
(b) In a criminal action, the defendant shall be notified no later than
10 days before trial that a statement which qualifies as a hearsay excep-
tion pursuant to this subsection will be offered as evidence at trial. The
notice shall include a written statement of the content of the child's state-
ment, the time at which the statement was made, the circumstances sur-
rounding the statement which indicate its reliability, and such other partic-
ulars as necessary to provide full disclosure of the statement.
(c) The court shall make specific findings of fact, on the record, as to
the basis for its ruling under this subsection.
101. Weatherford, 561 So. 2d at 633.
102. 561 So. 2d 597 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1990).
103. Weatherford, 561 So. 2d at 634.
104. Id.
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treat this error as harmless because the testimony vouching for the
child's credibility was provided by an expert witness. Allowing such tes-
timony would be putting an impressively qualified expert's stamp of
truthfulness on the witness' story.10 5
F. Hypnosis
"Hypnosis is a state of heightened concentration with diminished
awareness of peripheral events."106 The use of hypnosis in crime inves-
tigation has increased in the past twenty years. Its increased use has
caused the courts to examine its admissibility. The principle issues con-
cerning the admissibility of hypnotic evidence involve: (1) statements
made by a person while under hypnosis; and (2) the testimony of a
witness whose memory has been "refreshed" by hypnosis. Florida
courts have recently had occasion to address such issues.
In Morgan v. State,10 the appellant was convicted of first degree
murder and sentenced to death for brutally murdering an elderly wo-
man. The appellant was at the deceased's home to mow her yard. He
entered the house presumably to telephone his father, then killed the
woman by crushing her skull with a crescent wrench and stabbing her
face, neck and hands numerous times. He also bit her breast and trau-
matized her genital area. There was no dispute that appellant commit-
ted the homicide. The single issue was his sanity at the time of the
offense.10 8 The court held that the trial court erroneously excluded
medical expert opinion testimony based on a diagnosis derived from
Morgan during hypnosis.' 09
Morgan was hypnotized by a psychologist in a psychiatrist's pres-
ence. Both experts concluded from their examination of Morgan, his
history, and the hypnotic session that he was insane at the time of the
105. Id.
106. State v. Hurd, 432 A.2d 86, 90 (N.J. 1981).
107. 537 So. 2d 973 (Fla. 1989).
108. This was the third time the case was before the Florida Supreme Court. In
the initial Morgan v. State, the court remanded the case because the bifurcated in-
sanity procedure had been held unconstitutional. In the second proceeding, the Florida
Supreme Court remanded the case because the trial court denied Morgan an opportu-
nity to present an insanity defense.
109. Morgan, 537 So. 2d at 975. Prior to the trial, a psychologist met with Mor-
gan on three occasions. After his second session, he decided to hypnotize Morgan with
a psychiatrist's assistance, to obtain further details concerning the incident.
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offense under the M'Naghten Test."' Both doctors testified at trial that
"hypnosis is a medically-accepted diagnostic technique used by mental
health professionals.""' Additionally, both experts testified at trial that
they were not able to assess the defendant's sanity without using the
information from the hypnotic session. The trial court excluded the ex-
pert witnesses' testimony during the trial on the ground that their opin-
ions were partially based on statements made while Morgan was under
hypnosis." 2 The Florida Supreme Court concluded that the United
States Supreme Court decision in Rock v. Arkansas"3  was
controlling.' 4
In Rock, the defendant was charged with the manslaughter of her
husband. Since she could not remember the details surrounding the in-
cident, she was hypnotized by a licensed neuropsychologist to refresh
her memory. After the hypnosis, she was able to recall that she did not
have her finger on the trigger at the time of the shooting; the gun had
discharged when her husband grabbed her arm during a fight. At trial,
the court limited the defendant's testimony to only those matters
remembered and stated prior to being placed under hypnosis. On ap-
peal, the Supreme Court of Arkansas rejected the appellant's claim
that the limitations on her testimony violated her right to present her
defense.."5 The U.S. Supreme Court held that a state may not apply
rules of evidence that permit a witness to take the stand but arbitrarily
exclude material portions of his testimony. 1 6 Therefore, when it is the
defendant who submits to pretrial hypnosis, and not merely a defense
witness, the experience of being hypnotized will not render his testi-
mony inadmissible if he elects to take the stand.
The Florida Supreme Court stated that even without reliance upon
Rock, it would conclude that expert testimony in this case must be
allowed. It found the issue was not whether the hypnotic statements
110. Id. In a majority of jurisdictions, the M'Naghten test is used to determine
insanity. The test is derived from M'Naghten's Case, 8 Eng. Rep. 718 (1843) and
provides that an accused is not criminally responsible if, at the time of committing the
act, he was laboring under such a defect of reason, from disease of the mind, as not to
know the nature and quality of the act he was doing, or if he did know it that he did
not know what he was doing was wrong.
111. Morgan, 537 So. 2d at 975.
112. Id.
113. 483 U.S. 44 (1987).
114. Morgan, 537 So. 2d at 975.
115. Rock, 483 U.S. at 56.
116. Id.
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were reliable, but rather, whether mental health experts could testify
about Morgan's sanity if their opinion was based in part on information
received from hypnotic statements obtained through medically ap-
proved diagnostic techniques.117
The court in Morgan noted that because the use of hypnosis is an
evolving issue, safeguards are necessary to assure its reliability." 8 Safe-
guards should include recording the hypnosis session to ensure compli-
ance with proper procedures and practices. When hypnosis is used to
refresh a defendant's memory or to facilitate a medical diagnosis, rea-
sonable notice should be given to the opposing party." 9
The Supreme Court of Florida has had several occasions to ex-
amine the reliability and practical application of post-hypnotic testi-
mony. In Bundy v. State,'20 the Supreme Court of Florida held that
hypnotically refreshed testimony is per se inadmissible in a criminal
trial. 21 However, it found that a witness who has been hypnotized is
still competent to testify to those facts recalled prior to hypnosis.'22 In
a subsequent case, Stokes v. State,'2s the Supreme Court of Florida
again reviewed the problems raised by the use of hypnosis in court.
Based on previous studies, the court recognized three major concerns:
heightened suggestibility; the tendency of the hypnotized subject to
"confabulate," a phenomenon of inventing details that the subject has
not actually recalled, i.e., a tendency to "fill in the blanks" of the sub-
ject's memory; and the phenomenon known as "memory hardening." '124
Basically, one who has been hypnotized becomes more certain of his
117. Morgan, 537 So. 2d at 976.
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. 471 So. 2d 9 (Fla. 1985), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 894 (1986) (known as
Bundy II).
121. Id. at 18. Even though Bundy II prohibited the offering of the hypnotically-
refreshed testimony as direct evidence, it did not preclude all use of lypnosis.
122. Id.
123. 548 So. 2d 188 (Fla. 1989). Stokes moved in limine to exclude the eyewit-
ness' post-hypnotic description, the identification of his brother's car, and the hypnotic
session in its entirety from the trial testimony. The trial court excluded the session but
ruled that because the post-hypnotic statements were substantially similar to the pre-
hypnotic statements, the descriptions and the identification were admissible. Id. at 196.
124. Id. at 190-91 (citing Diamond, Inherent Problems in the Use of Pretrial
Hypnosis on a Prospective Witness, 68 CALIF. L. REV. 313 (1980)). "Memory harden-
ing" affects one's ability to resolve doubts and uncertainties, resulting in the subject
becoming more certain of his or her memories regardless of the accuracy of those mem-
ories. Id.
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recollection of the events. 25
The court in Stokes reasoned that the practical effect of these con-
cerns is that the hypnotized witness is extremely difficult to cross-ex-
amine on any subject raised in the hypnosis session. Cross-examining a
hypnotized witness becomes futile because previously hypnotized wit-
nesses develop an unshakable certitude about their memories that ordi-
nary witnesses seldom exhibit.126 This effect in turn can be viewed as
an infringement, if not a denial, of the defendant's sixth amendment
right to confront witnesses against him. Thus, the court reviewed four
approaches to the admissibility of hypnotically-refreshed testimony in
light of these evidentiary concerns: 1) per se inadmissibility; 2) condi-
tional admissibility provided the federal procedural safeguards have
been fulfilled; 3) per se admissibility; and 4) a balancing approach in
accordance with Rule 403 of the Federal Rules of Evidence. 127
Upon consideration of the four approaches to this problem, the Su-
preme Court of Florida, in Stokes, decided that the Frye test was the
appropriate test of admissibility for post-hypnotic testimony. 128 There-
fore, the court found that it was required to examine the research and
literature to determine if hypnosis is generally accepted in the scientific
community. Its examination of the available literature revealed that the
scientific community was divided or leaned towards disapproval of hyp-
nosis as a reliable means of accurately enhancing memory. 12 9 The court
adopted this view, finding the procedural safeguards insufficient to pro-
tect against the inherent unreliability of hypnotically-refreshed testi-
mony.130 Thus, the testimony of a witness who has undergone hypnosis
for the purpose of refreshing his memory of the event at issue is inad-
missible as to all additional facts relating to those events from the time
of the hypnotic session forward.' 3' The witness who has been hypno-
tized may testify to the statements made before the hypnotic session if
they are properly recorded, which means that the statement must be
taken down on paper, recorded on video or audio tape, or reduced to
writing in a police officer's notes or report.132 Consequently, the court
found that under these rules, a hypnotic session activates a time bar-
125. Id. at 191.
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. Id. at 195 (see infra note 189 for an explanation of the Frye test).
129. Stokes, 548 So. 2d at 195.
130. Id.
131. Id. at 196.
132. Id.
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rier, after which no identifications or statements may be admitted.'33
G. Compelled Mental Examinations
In Florida v. Rhone,34 the First District Court of Appeal held
that a mental examination of a victim should be ordered only under the
most compelling circumstances where it is necessary to ensure a just
and orderly disposition of the case, even in a sexual battery and kidnap-
ping case. However, at the same time, the court did not expressly reject
the concept of the trial court possessing inherent power to compel a
mental examination of a victim. The court stated that it would discour-
age the practice in all but the most extreme instances.3 5 The court
reached this conclusion by relying on Dinkins v. State.13
In Dinkins, the defense moved for psychiatric examination of a
victim to furnish possible basis for impeachment. The Fourth District
Court of Appeal refused to order the examination. 37 The Rhone Court
also discussed State v. Coe,"8" in which the defense moved for the psy-
chiatric examination of a rape victim. The Second District Court of
Appeal quashed the trial court's order, following the Dinkins rationale
that strong and compelling reasons must exist to warrant such an ex-
amination.'39 Unlike Rhone, in neither Dinkins nor Coe was the state
introducing psychological testimony as part of its case-in-chief.
In Rhone, the defense moved for an order requiring the sexual bat-
terer to submit to an independent psychological examination contend-
ing an examination was essential to refute the state's case. The state
sought to introduce evidence from a psychological expert on the "bat-
tered woman syndrome"' 40 to bolster its case regarding the element of
lack of consent.
133. Id.
134. 566 So. 2d 1367 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1990).
135. Id. at 1369.
136. 244 So. 2d 148 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1971).
137. Id. at 150.
138. 521 So. 2d 373 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1988).
139. Id. at 376.
140. The battered woman syndrome is described as when "a man physically and
psychologically abuses a wife or loved one, gains her forgiveness, seeks her love and
reconciliation and then repeats the cycle over and over so many times that the woman,
at all times hoping the relationship will last, is reduced to a state of learned helpless-
ness." See L. WALKER, THE BATTERED WOMAN (1979); Note, A Trend Emerges: A
State Survey on the Admissibility of Expert Testimony Concerning the Battered Wo-
man Syndrome, 25 J. FAM. L. 373 (1986-87).
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The victim accompanied the defendant (apparently voluntarily) to
his home or his relatives' home and remained there for a twelve to
twenty-four hour period during which the alleged sexual battery oc-
curred. The victim did not immediately attempt to escape and re-
mained at the house with the defendant and his relatives - even eating
breakfast together, without making the relatives aware that anything
was wrong."4
In Rhone, the court held that there were strong and compelling
reasons for the examination. 42 The court distinguished State v. Le-
blanc,'43 in which the Third District Court of Appeal quashed an order
compelling a psychological examination by defense doctors of three
children regarding whether the children manifested symptoms of sexual
abuse.4 That examination was intended to counter the testimony of
another expert which the state intended to call. In the Leblanc case, the
state's expert was appointed as an independent examiner by another
trial court and other evidence was available to evaluate the children. 45
Neither of these two situations existed in Rhone.146
H. Insanity Defense
In Hall v. State, 47 the Florida Supreme Court addressed the issue
of expert testimony in an insanity defense context. In 1987, Hall and
three acquaintances planned to travel to Virginia to work with a carni-
val. Because they had no money or means of transportation, they
planned to stop a car on the road, rob whomever had stopped, and steal
the person's car. Two of the individuals posed as hitchhikers with Hall,
while another co-defendant hid nearby. After the victim stopped, they
overpowered him, bound his ankles, wrists, mouth, and head with tape;
placed him in the car trunk; and drove north from Orlando. They re-
moved the victim from the trunk in Volusia County and dragged him
into a wooded area where one of the defendants, an alleged satanist,
carved an inverted cross on his chest and abdomen. Hall and a co-
141. Rhone, 566 So. 2d at 1367.
142. Id. at 1369.
143. 558 So. 2d 507 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1990).
144. Id. at 510.
145. The expert was provided with psychologist's reports, reports of the inter-
viewer of the victims at the Children's Center, and video-taped interviews of the chil-
dren. Id. at 508-09.
146. 566 So. 2d 1367.
147. 568 So. 2d 882 (Fla. 1990).
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defendant shot the victim seven times.148
The trial judge refused to allow Hall to present expert testimony
during the guilt phase of the trial to support his insanity defense.149
The Supreme Court of Florida held this was reversible error. 50 At the
end of Hall's case in chief and after Hall had testified in his own de-
fense, Hall's counsel proffered the written reports of a Professor of Re-
ligion, and a Clinical Psychiatrist, as expert testimony. In his Notice of
Insanity Defense, counsel proffered that both experts could testify that
"the nature of the temporary insanity at the time of the offense is that
the defendant acted under the influence of Satan and/or Bernie Dixon,
his co-defendant," and therefore was robbed of his free will; he did not
know right from wrong under the M'Naghten Rule 5' at the time of the
offense.' 52 The trial court refused to admit the expert testimony, stating
"there is no defense in Florida ... that says the Devil made me do
it.'' 53 On appeal the court held that the trial court erred by refusing to
allow the experts to testify. The experts were found to b- qualified to
provide expert testimony on Hall's sanity or lack of sanity and their
testimony was found to be relevant to that issue. 54 The expert was a
clinical psychologist with experience in evaluating the mental health of
patients and had examined the defendant. The expert doctor did not
base his opinion on the defendant's inability to distinguish right from
wrong solely on his alleged influence of Satan. Instead, the doctor ex-
plained that the defendant displayed characteristics of individuals with
schizophrenic disorders, and on the day of the shooting, defendant was
in a state of altered consciousness brought on by extreme stress. 55
Therefore, according to the doctor, Hall was unable to distinguish right
from wrong at the time of the offense. The court found that such evi-
dence met the requirement of the M'Naghten Rule 56 and clearly was
relevant to Hall's defense of insanity.' 57
The trial court's ruling effectively prevented Hall from presenting
148. Id. at 883.
149. Id.
150. Id. at 886.
151. Id. at 884.
152. Hall, 568 So. 2d at 884.
153. Id.
154. Id. at 885-86.
155. Id. at 885.
156. See supra note 110.
157. Hall, 568 So. 2d at 885.
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his insanity defense to the jury.68 On this basis, reversal was required.
On the other hand, the Florida Supreme Court found no error in the
trial court's refusal to allow the religion professor to testify as to Hall's
alleged insanity. The court noted that the professor freely admitted in
his written report that he was not qualified to testify to the sanity or
insanity of an individual. The court conceded that although the profes-
sor may be qualified to offer expert testimony on religious subjects such
as satanism, defense counsel did not proffer his report for that
purpose.'6 9
I. Psychological Autopsy
A psychological autopsy is a retrospective look at an individual's
suicide to try to determine what led the subject to choose suicide. The
defendant in Jackson v. State16 0 was convicted in Broward County of
child abuse arising out of the suicide death of her daughter, a nude
dancer. The Fourth District Court of Appeal held that the state
presented sufficient evidence establishing that a psychological autopsy
is accepted in the field of psychiatry as a method of evaluation in cases
involving suicide, and that the judge acted within his discretion in ad-
mitting this evidence at trial.' 6' The expert witness reviewed the rele-
vant data which included the child's school records, police records, all
the state's evidence, the defendant's statements and medical records, a
report regarding the child's earlier suicide attempt and witnesses testi-
mony from the trial.'62 The expert's opinion was that the nature of the
relationship between the defendant and her daughter was the substan-
tial contributing factor in the daughter's decision to commit suicide. 63
J. Tool Marks
There are three basic types of tool marks: (1) an impression,
which is a negative reproduction of a portion of the tool which con-
tacted the marked surface; (2) an abrasion, friction, or scrape mark-
ing;"6 and (3) a combination of an abrasion or an impression in the
158. Id. at 886.
159. Id. at 884.
160. 553 So. 2d 719 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1989) (per curiam).
161. Id. at 720.
162. Id.
163. Id.
164. Such marks are caused by the pushing, pulling or sliding of a tool across an
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same mark." 5 When identifying a tool mark, one must look at both
class and individual characteristics in the mark and on the tool
surfaces.
Class characteristics include such things as size and general config-
uration of tools. Individual characteristics, on the other hand, in-
clude structure or combinations of structure which are unique and
distinctive of just one specific implement. Such individual charac-
teristics are random in nature and normally result from wear, from
devices used in the manufacturing process, and from grinding or
other finishing procedures. They are also produced by wear and
breakage occurring through use of tools after manufacture.168
There is a sizable body of case law which provides precedent for
the admission of a vast array of tools and tool markings. 67 Tools
matched with markings made by them include drills, screw drivers,
crow bars, tire irons, hammers, paper punches, bolt cutters and
pliers e168
In Ramirez v. State,16 9 the Supreme Court of Florida dealt with
the admissibility of tool mark evidence discovered on the decedent's
cartilage. Mr. Ramirez was convicted of first degree murder and sen-
tenced to death for the homicide of a 27-year-old woman who was a
night courier at the Federal Express office in Miami. The cause of
death was multiple stab wounds to her body and blunt trauma to her
head. A bloody fingerprint was recovered on a door jamb near the vic-
tim's body. The fingerprint technician positively identified the finger-
print as belonging to Mr. Ramirez, an employee of the janitorial com-
pany which serviced the Federal Express offices. Mr. Ramirez was
arrested and charged with first degree murder based upon the finger-
object upon which a recorded mark is produced by the surface of the tool. Cut marks
are also of this type.
165. These usually consist of an abrasion mark at the end of which is an impres-
sion of at least part of the end of the tool. See Burd & Greene, Tool Mark Examina-
tion Techniques, 2 J. FORENSIC Sci. 297-98 (1957).
166. Burd & Gilmore, Individual and Class Characteristics of Tools, 13 J. Fo-
RENSIC Sci. 390 (1968).
167. See A. MOENSSENS. F. INBAJ & J. STARRS, SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE IN CRIMI-
NAL CASES 259-61 (3d ed. 1986) [hereinafter SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE IN CRIMINAL
CASES] (discussing the precedent for the admission of tools and tool markings).
168. Id.
169. 542 So. 2d 352 (Fla. 1989).
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print identification.?T0
During the autopsy, the assistant medical examiner noticed a
mark made on the cartilage in the victim's chest. An evidence techni-
cian who had qualified as an expert in tool marks and ballistics was
asked to examine the marks and compare them with a knife found in
the defendant's girlfriend's car. At trial, the defendant's girlfriend tes-
tified that she usually kept the knife in her car for protection. After the
incident, she found the knife in her kitchen sink and washed it. When
the knife was examined by the laboratory, traces of blood were de-
tected on it but in insufficient amounts to determine their origin.'7'
At a hearing prior to trial and at trial, the evidence technician was
qualified as a tool mark expert and testified that the knife found in the
car was the specific knife which produced the victim's chest wound. On
appeal, Mr. Ramirez argued that his conviction should be set aside be-
cause the trial court erroneously allowed a ballistics and tool mark ex-
pert to identify the knife as the murder weapon." 2
The Florida Supreme Court stated that no scientific predicate was
established from independent evidence to show that a specific knife can
be identified from the marks made on the cartilage. According to the
court, "the only evidence received was the expert's self-serving state-
ment supporting this procedure."' 73 The court conceded that the quali-
fication of the witness was not the primary issue in the case, rather, it
was the reliability of testing the testing methods which formed the ba-
sis of the witness' conclusion. 74
The Florida Supreme Court ruled that new scientific methods of
establishing evidence will be accepted only after a proper predicate has
established the reliability of the new scientific method. 75 The court re-
lied upon Ramos v. State, 76 where it was held that there was no
proper predicate to establish the reliability of dog scent discrimination
line-ups. In Ramos, the only evidence concerning the scent discrimina-
170. Id. at 353.
171. Id. at354.
172. Id. Ramirez also argued that portions of his sworn statement in the motion
to suppress were improperly introduced at trial by the state; the state attorney failed to
supply the defense with the name of the cellmate to whom Ramirez allegedly con-
fessed; there was insufficient circumstantial evidence to support a finding of guilt; and
the trial court improperly denied his motion to suppress physical evidence.
173. Id. at 355.
174. Id.
175. Id.
176. 496 So. 2d 121 (Fla. 1986).
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tion line-up's reliability was the testimony of the dog handler. The
court also compared Ramirez to Bundy v. State,17 7 in which the court
rejected hypnotically refreshed testimony because of an improper predi-
cate of scientific reliability, and to Delap v. State,178 in which the ad-
missibility of polygraph tests was addressed. 17 9
Since the statements made by the tool mark expert which linked
the murder weapon to the defendant possibly could have influenced the
jury verdict, the court held that such testimony could not be viewed as
harmless error. There was some limited evidence from which the jury
could infer Ramirez did not commit the offense.'8 The court stated
that it would have held that the knife itself could have been properly
admitted as relevant evidence because it was an instrument which
could have caused the victim's wounds based on the medical examiner's
testimony and other evidence linking the knife to Ramirez. In light of
the fundamental error though, the conviction was reversed and the case
remanded for a new trial.18'
Unfortunately, the court seemed to ignore significant testimony
which would serve as a predicate for the admission of this evidence.'82
Technician Hart testified about the general study of tool marks and
their identification as a recognized field of scientific endeavor. In addi-
tion, during the motion hearing and trial the state also referred to
State v. Churchill,'i 3 a Supreme Court of Kansas case which approved
the admissibility of similar evidence. At trial, the medical examiner,
Dr. Rao, testified that "cartilage can sometimes retain shapes of partic-
ular injuries, a particular instrument or weapon."184 Mr. Hart testified
that the procedures he used were the standard procedures applicable to
striation tool marks which are accepted within the field of tool mark
identification by experts throughout the country.185 He also testified to
his qualifications' 86 and stated that he had co-authored a scholarly arti-
177. 471 So. 2d 9 (Fla. 1985), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 894 (1986).
178. 440 So. 2d 1242 (Fla. 1983), cert. denied, 467 U.S. 1264 (1984).
179. Ramirez, 542 So. 2d at 355.
180. Id. at 356.
181. Id. Ramirez is presently being retried before Judge Sepe in Dade County
Circuit Court.
182. Id. at 354-55.
183. 231 Kan. 408, 646 P.2d 1049 (1982).
184. Trial Transcript at 1029, State v. Ramirez, 542 So. 2d 352 (Fla. 1989)
(No. 83-29429).
185. Id. at 1549.
186. Id. at 1598-99.
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cle which positively identified a knife as the tool that caused a particu-
lar stab wound to human cartilage in another case. 187 The expert
presented the paper prior to its publication at the 35th Annual Meeting
of the American Academy of Forensic Sciences (AAFS) in Cincinnati,
Ohio in February, 1983.188 Clearly, if there were any objections by the
scientific community to this method of identification of knives, it would
have been made known at the AAFS presentation, or in letters to the
editor after the article was published. Because there were no negative
comments, one could conclude this. evidence not only met the reliability
test, but also met the Frye test.189
K. Trace Evidence
Crime scenes often yield physical evidence that can be compared
with known materials to determine the origin of the evidence. This evi-
dence is often termed trace evidence. It includes such items as hair,
fibers, wood, paint chips, soil and glass. Because of the minute size of
the particles involved and the necessity of examining the microscopic
characteristics of the evidence to make a comparison, the science of
187. Rao & Hart, Toolmark Determination in Cartilage of Stabbing Victim, 29
J. FORENSIC Sci. 794-99 (1983).
188. The American Academy of Forensic Sciences is a professional society dedi-
cated to the application of science to the law. It includes in its membership approxi-
mately 3700 physicians, criminalists, toxicologists, attorneys, dentists, physical anthro-
pologists, document examiners, engineers, educators and others who practice and
perform research in the many diverse fields of forensic science. The members of the
Academy reside in all 50 states and possessions, in Canada, and in over 30 other coun-
tries. The Academy is committed to the promotion of education and the elevation of'
accuracy, precision, and specificity in the forensic sciences. It does so via the Journal of
Forensic Sciences, newsletters and the conduct of seminars and meetings. It conducts
an annual scientific meeting wherein hundreds of scientific papers are presented and
workshops are held.
189. Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923). The Frye "general
acceptance" test for admissibility of novel scientific evidence is drawn from the oft-
quoted language of the case:
Just when a scientific principle or discovery crosses the line between the
experimental and demonstrable stages is difficult to define. Somewhere in
this twilight zone the evidential force of the principle must be recognized,
and while courts will go a long way in admitting expert testimony deduced
from a well-recognized scientific principle or discovery, the thing from
which the deduction is made must be sufficiently established to have
gained general acceptance in the particular field in which it belongs.
Id. at 1014.
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analyzing trace evidence is called microanalysis. A recent Florida case
discusses one type of trace evidence, hair.
In State v. Sawyer,' the court held that hair evidence was inad-
missible where the evidence could have seriously prejudiced the defend-
ant. In this case the trial court granted the defendant's motion in
limine to exclude hair as evidence in a first degree murder case. The
victim was discovered beaten, tortured and murdered in her apartment.
During the course of the investigation several unknown hairs were
found on or around the victim's body in her upstairs bedroom, and one
unknown hair was found beneath the kitchen window. During the mo-
tion hearing, a hair and fiber expert from the Federal Bureau of Inves-
tigation testified the one unknown pubic hair found under the kitchen
window had not been forcibly removed and did not match the other
unknown hairs found in the victim's apartment. 191 The hair matched
Sawyer's pubic hair sample in twenty observable characteristics. 92 The
expert testified that this did not mean the hair was absolutely identified
as belonging to Sawyer but rather the hair came from someone within
a class of individuals having the same hair characteristics as the
defendant. 3
The expert also testified that the hair could have been transferred
by other means. Numerous people walked in and out of the crime scene
where evidence was being collected, violating the concept of preserving
the crime scene, may have contaminated the scene. The agent could not
testify as to how a given hair could get to a particular location, espe-
cially in light of extensive contamination. Because the hair could not be
positively identified as being from Sawyer and was not probative in
proving that Sawyer was in the victim's apartment at the time of the
murder, the appellate court held that the trial judge properly ruled the
evidence to be inadmissible.9 4
L. Blood Alcohol Tests
In State v. Miller,'95 the court held that the State is not necessa-
rily required to prove an accused's blood alcohol level was greater than
190. 561 So. 2d 278 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1990).
191. Id. at 283.
192. Id.; see also SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE IN CRIMINAL CASES, supra note 168, at
475-95 (discussing the identification characteristics of hair).
193. Sawyer, 561 So. 2d at 283.
194. Id at 284.
195. 555 So. 2d 391 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1989).
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.1 % at the time of driving in order to convict him of driving under the
influence of alcohol. The State need only prove that based on the total-
ity of admissible evidence, the defendant's normal faculties were im-
paired. The question of timeliness is for the trier of fact in each case,
although the timing of the blood alcohol level test may affect accu-
racy.'96 The court held that based upon the statute and the weight of
authority, the result of a properly administered test measuring the ac-
cused's blood alcohol level is relevant evidence, and any failure of the
State to extrapolate the result back to the time of driving goes to the
weight of the evidence rather then to its admissibility. 197
IV. IMPROPER USE OF THE MEDICAL TREATISE
In Chorzelewski v. Drucker,198 the appellate court held that the
trial court erred in permitting the plaintiff's attorney to read text from
the medical treatise to the plaintiff's expert witness, and in permitting
the expert witness to bolster his own opinion testimony by using the
medical treatise during his direct examination. 99 Section 90.706 of the
Florida Statutes permits introduction of a medical treatise only in the
cross-examination of an expert witness.2 00
V. CONCLUSION
From 1988 to 1991 the supreme court and district courts of appeal
in Florida have rendered significant and interesting decisions regarding
scientific evidence and expert witness testimony. In fact, some of the
decisions such as Ramirez have been unique among all scientific evi-
196. Id. at 393. The court found that any time lapse in the test administration or
failure to extrapolate the result back to the time of the driving goes to the weight of the
evidence, not its admissibility.
197. Id. at 393-94.
198. 546 So. 2d 1118 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1989).
199. Id. at 1118.
200. FLA. STAT. § 90.706 (1989) provides:
Statements of facts or opinions on a subject of science, art, or specialized
knowledge contained in a published treatise, periodical, book, dissertation,
pamphlet, or other writing may be used in cross-examination of an expert
witness if the expert witness recognizes the author or the treatise, periodi-
cal, book, dissertation, pamphlet or other writing to be authoritative, or,
notwithstanding nonrecognition by the expert witness, if the trial court
finds the author or the treatise, periodical, book, dissertation, pamphlet, or
other writing to be authoritative and relevant to the subject matter.
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dence decisions in the country. 0 1 Florida courts also seem to continue
the trend toward acceptance of novel scientific evidence begun by An-
drews v. State,02 provided the evidence is reliable, not prejudicial, and
a proper predicate has been laid for its admissibility. What remains to
be seen is whether the Florida Supreme Court will soon provide a de-
finitive statement regarding the test for the admissibility of scientific
evidence in Florida since recent decisions have discussed both the Frye
test2°0 and the test under section 90.702 of the Florida Statutes,0 4
without stating which is the better or correct view.
201. See supra notes 169-189 and accompanying text.
202. 533 So. 2d 841 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1988).
203. See supra note 189..
204. See supra notes 17-18 and accompanying text.
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